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Abstract
Differences in optimal firm size may only be explained by heterogeneity amongst
enterprises and the markets in which they operate. Therefore, the concept of the rep-
resentative enterprise from the traditional theory of the firm is not helpful in explain-
ing size differences. Differences in firm size may better be explained using recent de-
velopments in labour  economics that stress the heterogeneity of workers and enter-
prises. In this paper, we exploit these new developments in labour  economics by
building a simulation model of the firm, which explicitly considers the link between
internal and external labour  markets and the resulting worker flows. Simulations with
the model show how factors that account for differences in transaction costs and for
heterogeneity of workers generate enterprises of different sizes.
Keywords: firm size, transaction costs, human capital, internal labour  market, labour
flows.
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1. Introduction
Traditional neo-classical microeconomic theory, based on the concept of the repre-
sentative firm, cannot explain why firms differ in size. Economies of scale, resulting
from technical and allocational efficiency, can explain cross-industry differences in
average firm size. It does, however, not explain the size distribution of firms found in
the real world. Other theories have been developed to explain the vast heterogeneity in
firm size. Three alternative approaches to explain firm size may be distinguished
(You, 1995). According to the transaction cost approach (or institutional approach),
firm size is determined by transaction cost efficiency*. Within the industrial organiza-
tion approach, size distribution is explained by market power. Thirdly, the growth ap-
proach focuses on the dynamics of the size distribution of firms. This approach in-
cludes life-cycle models and evolutionary models on firm growth. The relevance of
these approaches has been examined in a number of empirical studies. For example,
Davis and Henrekson (1999) have examined the role of institutions in explaining na-
tional differences in firm size distribution, and Almus and Nerlinger (1999) combined
elements from the neo-classical and growth approach to explain growth of new tech-
nology-based enterprises.
Recently, another possible determinant of firm size has received the attention of eco-
nomic research: labour  flows. Analysis of large longitudinal datasets at enterprise
level has provided much insight into the specific characteristics of labour  flows be-
tween enterprises and establishments, and their connection with labour  market dy-
namics (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990,1992;  Davis et al., 1996). A major finding is
that the largest part of job turnover (job creation + job destruction) takes place within
the same regions and branches of industry. It implies that job creation and job de-
struction are much more driven by idiosyncratic, firm-specific shocks than by demand
and supply shocks at macro level. Another finding is that worker flows exceed job
flows. For the Netherlands, Hamermesh et al. (1996) find that worker turnover is
roughly three times as large as job turnover.
Differences in firm size are likely to affect worker turnover and internal labour  flows,
and vice versa. From that perspective, this study examines the relation between firm
size and internal labour  flows. In doing so, we combine literature on labour  flows with
the standard neo-classical and transaction cost approaches to explain firm size. For
this purpose, we construct an empirical simulation model that incorporates various
mechanisms that may be regarded as underlying sources of firm heterogeneity. Al-
though firm behaviour is described by profit maximization, building and solving an
analytical model that incorporates all required sources of heterogeneity appeared im-
possible. Therefore, we were forced to recourse to a simulation model that is cali-
brated using the scarce empirical evidence on internal labour  flows (Van Gameren,
2000). In this paper, we investigate in what manner this combination of theories ex-
*plains firm size differences.
2 From a macroeconomic point of view, transaction costs include costs associated with existing institutions. Trans-
action cost theory then effectively becomes an institutional theory of the firm (You, 1995, page 448).
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The content of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews what the literature on
transaction costs, hierarchical models of the firm, equilibrium search theory and inter-
nal labour  markets can teach us about the underlying sources of heterogeneity
amongst enterprises. This gives us a hint on how to make this heterogeneity opera-
tional in the model. Section 3 discusses how these features are implemented in the
simulation model. Next, we identify the various characteristics of firm size distribu-
tion that we shall examine with this model. The simulation outcomes are presented
and discussed in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical background
Transaction costs
Adam Smith stated that firm size is determined by benefits and costs of specialization
of labour,  resulting in economies of scale. The degree of specialization would be lim-
ited mainly by the extent of the markets. Coase (1937) examined whether this spe-
cialization should take place within one single firm, or between several enterprises.
He introduced the idea of transaction costs, to explain which transactions should take
place in the market, and which transactions are more efficient within the framework of
an enterprise. Transaction cost theory assumes that all transactions are costly due to
bounded rationality and opportunism. We adopt the concept of transaction costs to
incorporate the cost of an enterprise’s internal organization in our simulation model.
A transaction is any transfer of goods or services from one individual to another.
Transactions can take place either within or between firms; in this paper we focus on
transactions within firms, and, therefore, on internal transaction costs. All transactions
require coordination and cooperation from the individuals involved; hence, transaction
costs can be classified into coordination and motivation costs (Milgrom and Roberts,
1992). Internal coordination consists of several steps (each resulting in internal coor-
dination costs): obtaining information needed to determine an efficient plan for a
transaction; using the knowledge available to determine the plan to be implemented;
communicating the plan to those responsible for implementing it; and monitoring the
plan. Motivation cost may arise due to information incompleteness, information
asymmetries and imperfect commitment (resulting in hold-up problems). Nooteboom
(1993) and Gamsey (1998) argue that small businesses have a behavioural advantage
over large enterprises, in that employees in smaller businesses are more motivated.
This results in higher motivation costs (per employee) for larger enterprises.
These transaction costs refer to costs of vertical transactions: transactions that involve
different hierarchical levels within an enterprise. However, transactions may also take
place within a certain level. Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that both horizontal co-
ordination and motivation cost per employee increase with the number of employees.
.
3 Assuming that employers want to maximize their profits
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Hierarchical models of the firm
Williamson (1967) used a hierarchical model of an individual enterprise to examine
determinants of optimal firm size 4. This model delineates a price-taking enterprise
with m administrative levels. Each employee may supervise s subordinates, i.e. the
span of control equals s. Williamson also introduced a ‘compliance’ or ‘loss of con-
trol’ parameter that indicates the effective contribution of an employee to the objec-
tives of his supervisor. The compliance parameter is less than 1, reflecting that ‘only a
fraction of the intentions of the superior is effectively satisfied by a subordinate’
(Williamson, 1967). Without loss of control, the enterprise would have an infinite
number of levels; in effect, its size would be limited by the size of the market only.
The loss-of-control parameter in this model may be interpreted as a measurement for
vertical internal transaction costs. This interpretation becomes clear when we explore
Williamson’s argument to introduce the loss of control. The intentions of the supervi-
sor will never be fully satisfied because either the communication between supervisor
and subordinate is imperfect, or because subordinates do not follow up on agreements
made. The first explanation reflects (vertical) coordination costs, the second motiva-
tion costs. Williamson’s (1967) conclusion that the compliance parameter must be
less than 1 for enterprises to become finite is, therefore, similar to the conclusion by
Coase (1937) that firm size is finite due to positive (internal) transaction costs.
Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that optimal firm size is related to the degree of spe-
cialization and coordination costs within hierarchical levels. In their model, individual
production increases with team size. This is because larger teams allow for more spe-
cialization. The benefits of specialization are balanced with the increasing costs of co-
ordination between a larger number of more specialized workers. They find that under
some general conditions, team size is limited by coordination costs instead of market
size.
Equilibrium search and internal labour markets
An objective for our simulation model is that it should outline the dynamic time path
of the enterprise in response to various types of external shocks. Therefore, the actual
firm size should continuously be adapted to its optimal size, taking account of adapta-
tion costs (e.g. costs of hiring, firing and training). So as to outline this dynamic ad-
justment process, the model combines insights of modem equilibrium search models
and the flow approach of the labour  market (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998) with
insights from internal labour  market models (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). These theo-
ries also explicitly take worker heterogeneity into account. This is another feature that
our model incorporates.
3. Internal labour  flows in a hierarchic&l model of the firm
Our simulation model focuses on formalizing decisions of personnel managers as re-
gards the allocation of employees over the jobs available. The model specifies hierar-
chical levels in line with Williamson (1967),  and applies the theory developed by
Becker and Murphy (1992) to model benefits and costs of cooperation within
4 This model has later been augmented by Calve  and Wellisz (1978) and Keren and Levhari (1979).
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teams/levels. This allows us to endogenize the span of control, which is exogenous in
Williamson (1967). In this section, we outline the specification and calibration of the
models.
Independent decisions
The key assumption in our hierarchical model is that each employee decides whether
he or she spends time on the production of output or on supervising subordinates (or
on a combination of both) independently from others in the enterprise. Under specific
conditions, this yields identical results as when all decisions are centralized. We con-
sider this decision for each individual to be taken by the management of the business
rather than by employees themselves.
Benejts  of specialization
Optimization starts with the highest-ranked person in the enterprise. He determines
the optimal number of subordinates for his circumstances by maximization of his
contribution to the business’s profits, weighting the costs and benefits of recruiting
additional subordinates. The benefits consist of the production generated by the sub-
ordinates. We specify individual production functions, based on the quality of the em-
ployee. If more subordinates are recruited, the tasks that must be performed and coor-
dinated by the supervisor may be divided over a larger group of subordinates. This
results in specialization of the subordinates, which yields an increased individual pro-
ductivity. A subordinate’s contribution to firm production is, therefore, modelled  as a
function of individual productivity and the number of subordinates within his team.
Horizontal and vertical transaction costs
However, increasing the number of subordinates also increases horizontal transaction
costs (both coordination and motivation). We assume that the horizontal transaction
costs per subordinate rise with the number of subordinates (Becker and Murphy,
1992). The combined effect of specialization and horizontal coordination results in a
parabolic relation between the profits of the supervisor and the number of subordi-
nates. Individual productivity may benefit from cooperation with other subordinates
(of the same supervisor) at the same hierarchical level; however, hiring too many sub-
ordinates turns the cooperation into a negative factor when specialization is extended
too far.
The model also incorporates vertical transaction costs. These are the sum of foregone
production and loss of control. Foregone production measures the time a supervisor
has to spend on supervising and coordinating the subordinate; while coordinating, he
cannot contribute to production. The amount of coordination required by a subordi-
nate depends negatively on his qualities. Loss of control measures the extent as to
which, even after coordination, subordinates still will not be able/willing to produce
the output required by their supervisor. Besides horizontal and vertical transaction
costs, the costs of subordinates depend on their wages..
5 The model is presented in the appendix. It is a variant of the model developed by Van Gameren  (2000). We refer
to his study for further details.
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Finite firm size
Coase (1937) concluded that enterprises have a finite size due to positive transaction
costs. This is also the case for our model: in the absence of any transaction costs, firm
size is limited by the size of the market only (which is infinite, since we assume per-
fect competition). Transaction costs are necessary to ensure both a finite number of
hierarchical levels and a finite team size.
When the enterprise has reached its optimal size, marginal profits become zero and
additional subordinates are no longer beneficial. In other words, the production tech-
nology is modelled  in such a way that after a certain point, the supply curve becomes
upward sloping (due to decreasing returns to scale).
Adjustment costs
Until now, we discussed the costs and benefits of having subordinates. A major fea-
ture of our model is that it contains costs for changing the number of subordinates as
well. Adjustment costs arise if the optimal number of subordinates differs from the
actual number. We identify three types of adjustment costs. In the case of superfluous
employees, the employees having the lowest qualities are fired. The firm must pay
firing costs for each tired employee. If the enterprise has a staff shortage, it has to fill
vacancies by searching for suitable employees. The enterprise searches, first, among
the employees currently employed in other jobs at the business. We assume the super-
visor has insight in the qualities of the employees in the next lower rank in the hierar-
chy (perfect information). Second, if the capacities required are not available within
the enterprise, the supervisor may decide to recruit a new employee. This necessitates
an external search procedure that bears a higher cost level. External applicants (i.e.
their age and quality) are drawn from a random distribution; the enterprise has no in-
fluence on the arrival of candidates. This mimics, in a way, incomplete information. If
a candidate fails to meet the minimum requirements, a training procedure can be con-
sidered, at a certain cost. A possible outcome of the (external) application procedure is
that the job remains vacant.
Operation of the simulation model
Optimization of the profits of the entrepreneur and his search for subordinates - the
mechanisms of which are both discussed above - are the first two steps in the opera-
tion of the simulation model. The third step is that for each filled job, i.e. for each
subordinate, we repeat the optimization and search procedure, by taking into account
the central assumption: each employee takes independent decisions on whether he
works on the production of output, on the supervision of subordinates, or a combina-
tion of both. The optimal number of subordinates is independent from the decisions
made at other ranks and in other branches in the hierarchy: it is (modelled as) a purely
individual decision. As outlined above, we modelled  the structure of the profit func-
tion and the level of the transaction costs ‘in such a way that they set a limit on firm
-size.  Under this condition, the number of repetitions of steps 1 and 2 is finite, and it is
possible to delineate the enterprise by number of employees, organizational structure,
generated output and number of unfilled vacancies (step 4 in table 1). Notice that both
the number of hierarchical ranks and the number of subordinates per team are endoge-
nous  in the model.
6
After steps 1 to 4, we obtain the hierarchical set-up of the enterprise at the onset of a
period. All workers in the hierarchy remain at their jobs for (at least) one period and
produce output during this period. The passing of time generates an increase in the
experience of employees within the enterprise (‘learning by doing’), which is imple-
mented as an increase in their personal measure of quality. The effect depends on the
tenure in the current job and has a random component. At the end of the period, a ran-
dom number of employees decide to quit the company. Here, we may think of work-
ers who find jobs elsewhere, or workers who have other reasons to leave the labour
force. A fraction of the employees will retire; we impose a mandatory retirement age.
Furthermore, employees may get dismissed if their qualities do not meet minimum
requirements. This is possible only for employees who were recruited at the beginning
of the period, and needed a training course to enhance their qualities. If that training
doesn’t lift their quality levels to minimum requirements they will be dismissed. The
result of quits, retirements and fires is the opening of vacancies at the old positions.
Instead of immediately searching for candidates who may fill these vacancies (and the
unfilled vacancies remaining from the previous search process), we return to the op-
timization process (step 1) to determine whether it is optimal to search for employees
to fill the vacancies, or whether it is best to close the vacancies altogether. The next
steps in the modelling algorithm are conducted successively, as outlined above.
Table 1 Set-up of the simulation model
I I
STEP 1
STEP 2
STEP 3
STEP 4
STEP 5
Determination of optimal number of subordinates (per supervisor, per time period)
In the case of vacancies: search for employees
o Promotion of insiders (causes vacancy chains)
o Recruitment of outsiders (training might be necessary)
In the case of superfluous workers: dismiss the least qualified subordinates (the result of
this step might be that there remain unfilled vacancies)
Perform steps 1 and 2 for each subordinate until reaching the rank where the (optimal)
number of subordinates equals zero
Determine the number of employees, production (optimal, actual), hiring, firing, (flows,
cost) and organizational structure of the enterprise
o Random quits will occur
o There will be an increase in the experience of the employees who stay (‘learning by
doing’)
o Repeat steps 1 to 4 for the following period
Calibration of the model
The parameters of the model are calibrated upon the scarcely available empirical evi-
dence. Our baseline calibration generates a benchmark representative firm whose flow
characteristics (quits, fires, and internal and external worker flows) mimic the results
?ound  in a study by Hamermesh et al. (1996). This study presents estimates of the an-
nual worker flows in the Netherlands in 1990, drawn from a stratified sample of about
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1,000 enterprises with 10 or more employee&. The selection of the model parameters,
to generate our benchmark firm, is based on case studies on the internal economics of
enterprises by Baker et al. (1994) and Van Gameren  et al. (1999). Both case studies
utilize personnel records of a large enterprise, and specify  how the internal structure
such as the span of control and the wage scales of the business are organized. The
calibration of search costs is based on linear approximation of the quadratic adjust-
ment cost function of Pfann and Verspagen (1989). Their results suggest that in the
case.of  small adjustments, recruitment cost seem to be somewhat higher than the fir-
ing costs, while for more expansionary firms, hiring costs increase exponentially. We
assume that external search is more expensive than internal search, which implies that
the first option to fill vacancies is through internal moves.
Simulation results with our calibrated model of a representative business are shown in
table 2. The flows are based on simulations over 50 periods (or years)7,  and replicated
100 times to account for the random processes incorporated in the model. Averages
are taken over the last 25 years since during the initial years, the business grows to its
optimal size. The simulation results can be compared with the results of Hamermesh
et al. (1996) that are presented in the column ‘target size’.
Table 2 indicates that average firm size hardly fluctuates between the various simula-
tions: the standard deviation of the number of employees is small. A closer inspection
of the simulation results provides insights into the hierarchical structure. The em-
ployer hires four employees (say heads of units or plants). Each of these employees
wants to hire five subordinates (say heads of branches), and is eventually able to keep
these positions filled each period. These subordinates (20 in total) also want to hire
five employees each, but they are not always able to keep these positions occupied
(due to quits, retirements or dismissals, and the absence of internal candidates). It is
only at this lowest level that the simulated enterprises show any variation in number
of employees. Apparently, the heterogeneity between enterprises (quality, age and
tenure of employees) is not large enough to change the optimal number of subordi-
nates and levels between enterprises.
.
6 Allaart  et al. (2000) use a more recent data set for the Netherlands (concerning 1996). and find very similar
worker flow estimates.
7 In the model, a period is defined as a year. This facilitates both the modelling of the ageing of employees, and
the calibration using estimates of annual flows.
. I .’
Table 2 Simulation results*
Simulation results Target size
standard
Type and direction of worker flows mean deviation
Number of employees in the firm 1 2 3 1 . 9 0 1 3 6
Inflow
Hire to a newly created job (%) 2.0 1 . 7 0 3 . 2
Hire to an existing job (%) 7 . 8 3.39 8 . 7
outflow
Quits/retirements (%) 7.6 2.97
8 . 2
Direct fires (%) 1 . 9 1 . 5 3
Outflow from a destroyed job (%) 0.35 0.66 1 . 9
Internal mobiliry
To a newly-created job (%) 0.04 0.24 1.2
To an existing job (by direct subordinate) (“‘) 0.2 0 . 5 1
2 . 2
To an existing job (from other team) (%) 2 . 2 1 . 8 2
* The target sizes are taken from Hamermesh et al. (1996),  table 1, with the exception of the number of employees in
the fnm,  which is taken from  Van Gameren  (2000),  table 6.3. All percentages denote percentages of employment.
The sample standard deviations are calculated over the last 25 periods.
The table shows that the random processes that hit the enterprise cause more variation
in some of the labour  flows than in firm size. Our calibrated benchmark model is able
to reproduce the target values with respect to the inflow and outflow of employees
reasonably well. Its distribution of total outflow over outflow from existing jobs
(quits/retirements and direct fires8)  and outflow from destroyed jobs seems less suc-
cessful. Jobs are being destroyed (the annual job destruction rate is 1.2%),  but most
employees whose jobs are destroyed can find employment elsewhere in the enterprise.
It is, however, important to notice that the target sizes taken from Hamermesh et al.
(1996) represent a growing business: total inflow (11.9%) exceeds total outflow
(10.1%). Our calibrated benchmark model represents a business in equilibrium, with
constant firm size, and inflow and outflow being equal. Hamermesh et al. (1996) find
that the dismissal rate (both direct fires and outflow from destroyed jobs) is lowest for
enterprises with constant employment level, which suggests that the target size for
outflow from a destroyed job is set too high.
Target values for internal flows are the most difficult to reproduce in the calibration
procedure. Internal mobility towards new jobs is very low: once a business has stabi-
lized, new jobs are almost exclusively created at the lowest rank in the hierarchy
(where vertical mobility is, by definition, not possible). Vacancies that arise at higher
levels are mostly filled by internal mobility; external inflow occurs almost exclusively
at the lowest rank.
.
s Direct tires occur, when employees are tired because their qualities are insufficient. These employees directly
leave the firm, whilst their jobs remain intact. Indirect tires occur when jobs are destroyed; these employees can
apply for vacancies elsewhere in the firm.
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4. Firm size distributions
The size distribution of a population of firms may be described by various character-
istics. Our simulation model enables us to examine the following features?
(9
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
69
The average size of firms that survive for a certain number of years: the model
allows for the possibility that enterprises do not survive after 50  years, either
because the original owner cannot find a successor, or because at a certain
point all employees leave the business. Average firm size is taken over all sur-
viving enterprises.
The survival rate: the fraction of all simulated firms that survive after 50 years.
The average start-up length: the length of the start-up period is determined by
the first year in which the business reaches a size of at least 95% of the aver-
age size (for the scenario in table 2, the start-up length is 4 years).
The within-standard deviation of firm size: a measure of the average standard
deviation within each firm, over all periods of time: it indicates how the same
firms differ in size over time.
The between-standard deviation of firm size: a measure for the difference in
average firm size between enterprises: it indicates how different firms differ in
size at the same time.
To examine these characteristics of firm size distribution, the simulation model com-
bines elements from various approaches to explaining firm size. The relevance of the
neo-classical (or microeconomic) and transaction cost approaches have been exam-
ined before (You, 1995). Elements from these approaches that are incorporated in the
model are the relevance of labour  productivity, wage costs, costs and benefits of spe-
cialization and vertical transaction costs (loss of control and costs of supervision).
Equilibrium search theory is represented by random quits of employees, search costs,
and requirements for internal and external candidates. Finally, to take account of the
relevance of human capital of individual employees, the simulation model allows for
variation in the qualities of external candidates, and (variation in the effects of) learn-
ing by doing and firm-provided training.
The following two sections examine the relevance of these approaches by assessing
their impact on the five size distribution characteristics. Section 5 focuses on the mi-
croeconomic and transaction cost approaches, by studying the impact of changes in
labour  productivity and costs and benefits of specialization on firm size and labour
flows. In section 6, the working of the neo-classical mechanisms and the effect of
transaction costs is compared with the relevance of search theory and (heterogeneous)
human capital of individual employees for the size distribution of firms.
5. Labour  productivity, specialization and firm size
.
Labour productivity and firm  size
Our first simulation examines the impact of changes in average labour  productivity
(the annual production of a new employee with average quality). The calibration dis-
9 With the exception of the survival rate, all characteristics are calculated over the last 25 periods.
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cussed in the previous section resulted in a business with an average labour  produc-
tivity of 150 units a year (with the price of a unit of production normalized to 1). Fig-
ure 1 shows the relation between average labour  productivity and firm size. If average
labour  productivity is too low and does not cover (transaction) costs, entrepreneurs
don’t recruit any employees, and enterprises do not survive after  50 years. At a certain
threshold point 10, labour  productivity becomes high enough to make it profitable to
recruit employees, and a level is added to the firm. The survival rate of enterprises
now suddenly shifts to 100%.
Figure 1 Relation between firm  size and average labour  productivity*
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l The dotted lines represent average firm  size +/- 2 x the standard deviation of firm  size.
Firm size increases only if productivity becomes high enough to add a third level to
the firm, and later on a fourth level”. Changes in average labour  productivity have no
effect on the size of the teams. Additional profits from increased productivity are not
large enough to justify the costs of increased horizontal and vertical coordination that
are associated with an expanding team size.
This changes however, if average productivity is increased further. A small increase at
the next threshold point (from 155 to 156) now has two effects. An additional level is
added to the firm, which increases average firm size. Moreover, firms now differ also
in the sizes of their teams. Not only at the fifth level, but at all levels of the hierarchy.
Variation in team size increases with hierarchical level. This results in a large varia-
tion in firm size. Beyond this threshold point, average firm size is determined by team
size, and not so much by the number of hierarchical levels (for example: increasing
the average production level from 155 to 160 raises average firm size, whilst the
number of hierarchical levels remains the same).
This intriguing change in the working of the model may be explained as follows. All
stochastic elements in the simulation model are related to the human capital of indi-
vidual employees: qualities of new applicants, returns to training, effects of learning
*by doing and voluntary quits (voluntary quits result in a loss of human capital, and
open an opportunity to gain new human capital). It is, therefore, the heterogeneity in
1 0 At an average labour  productivity of 136; this value depends on the other parameter values.
11 At an average labour  productivity of 139 and 145, respectively.
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the human capital available that causes the variation in firm size. Two combined ef-
fects make this mechanism work in large enterprises in particular. Below, we explain
why.
Human capital influences marginal costs ofproduction
A supervisor will hire employees as long as marginal benefits of the additional pro-
duction exceed marginal costs. The marginal benefits of an additional unit of produc-
tion are by definition equal to output price, which is normalized to 1. The marginal
costs consist of marginal wage costs and marginal transaction costs (supervision costs
and adjustment costs). We assume marginal productivity wages: wages per output are
independent of human capital. In contrast, supervision costs per unit of output are
negatively related to the amount of human capital: more human capital implies both
higher production and lower supervision costs ‘2. To conclude: human capital influ-
ences marginal costs of additional production and, therefore, - in theory - the decision
on how many employees to hire.
This finding also explains why the variation in team size increases with the hierarchi-
cal level. This is because with each additional level, transaction costs (which depend
on human capital available) increase relative to wage costs. With each additional
level, the costs of managing the hierarchical firm become more importantls.
Human capital influences marginal costs and benefits of employees
Another way of analyzing the recruitment decision is to compare marginal costs and
benefits of recruiting an additional subordinate14. Due to the costs and benefits of spe-
cialization, both marginal costs and marginal benefits depend on the number of in-
cumbents.
The human capital of (incumbent) workers influences both marginal costs and mar-
ginal benefits of an additional subordinate. Whether this actually affects the (discrete)
recruitment decision, depends on how strong marginal costs and benefits depend on
the number of incumbent workers and on their human capital. Our simulations show
that average labour  productivity must exceed a certain threshold before human capital
actually affects firm size.
Specialization andfirm  size
Firm size is determined by the number of workers within each team, and the number
of hierarchical levels. Williamson (1967) modelled  the number of workers within each
.
1 2 The marginal adjustment costs of an additional unit of production are also negatively related to human capital,
but less strong than marginal supervision costs. This is because adjustment costs are independent of human
capital.
13 This is not a consequence of the structure of the model, but of the calibration process (see appendix). Different
values for the parameters that determine transaction costs could result in different conclusions.
1 4 Both the number of subordinates within a team and the number of hierarchical levels are determined by equating
the marginal costs and benefits of recruiting an additional subordinate (the number of hierarchical levels may be
found by deriving at which level it is optimal to recruit zero subordinates). In the appendix, an equation is de-
rived for this problem. As in the model by Williamson (1967),  this equation can only be solved numerically.
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team as an exogenous variable: the span of control. In his model, increasing the span
of control resulted in an increase in the number of levels, so that the effect on firm
size is twofold.
Instead, the span of control is endogenized in our model by introducing (the costs and I
benefits of) specialization. The net contribution of an individual to the total produc-
tion of its team is the difference between the benefits of specialization and the costs of
horizontal coordination. This combined effect is modelled  as a parabolic relation,
along the lines of Becker and Murphy (1992). Hence, we have an endogenous span of
control determined by the efficiency-maximizing team size (defined as the number of
employees for which the average net contribution per employee is maximal). This ef-
ficiency-maximizing team size may be manipulated by simultaneously changing costs
Figure 2 the relation between firm  size and the efficiency-maximizing team size.
Figure 2 the relation between firm size and the efficiency-maximizing team size.
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Note: the dotted lines represent the average firm size +I-  2 x the standard deviation of fum size.
and benefits of specialization.
Increasing the efficiency-maximizing team size from 1 to 7 employees increases the
average firm size from 4 to more than 700 employees (see figure 2). This is exactly
according to the expectations of the traditional microeconomic approach: economies
of scale (or specialization) have a positive impact on firm size. Contrary to William-
son (1967),  we find that increases in the efficiency-maximizing team size have no ef-
fect on the number of hierarchical levels.
The efficiency-maximizing team size is independent of wage and transaction costs. As I
a result, the simulated (profit maximizing) team size is not equal to the efficiency-
maximizing team size. In fact, the simulated team size differs between hierarchical
levels (since transaction costs differ between levels). With the exception of the highest
level, the simulated team size is larger than the efficiency-maximizing team size.
.
6. Different approaches to explaining firm size distribution
This section examines the effects of changes in several model parameters, for both a
small (25 employees) and a large (600 employees) benchmark firm. These parameters
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represent elements of the various approaches to explain firm size distribution: the
technical approach (wage costs, benefits of specialization), transaction cost approach
(costs of specialization, loss of control and supervision), equilibrium search theory
(search costs, requirements for candidates, quit rate) and human capital of individual
employees (variation in qualities of external candidates, effects of learning by doing
and training).
Simulating small and large enterprises
The small firm is simulated by selecting the value for average productivity. This
yields an enterprise with three levels, with approximately 25 employees (see table 3).
The large enterprise is simulated by enhancing average productivity so that profit
maximization yields an enterprise with five levels. Adding a fifth level results in
higher standard deviations of firm size, both within and between enterprises (see table
4). Simulation experiments show that this effect does not only occur when average
labour  productivity is enhanced: changes in other parameters may also result in large
enterprises with five levels and high within-/between-standard deviations.
The average rates of in- and outflow are comparable for small and large enterprises:
inflow is 9% of total employment for small and 11% for large enterprises. The differ-
ence is caused by the difference in average quit rates between small and large enter-
prises (because the quit rate differs between hierarchical levels, large enterprises have
ceteris paribus higher quit rates). The nature of the flows differs, however. For small
businesses, the majority of inflow concerns existing jobs, whilst for large enterprises
it is mostly inflow into newly created jobs. There are fewer fires in large than in small
businesses. The outflow from destroyed jobs is very similar.
Table 3 Simulation results for a small benchmark firm
Within-standard Between-standard
Type and direction of worker flows Average deviation deviation
Survival rate 99%
Start up length (years) 4
Number of levels 3 0 0
Number of employees in the firm 24.5 0.72 0.16
Inpow
Hire to a newly created job (%) 1.8 0.67 0.11
Hire to an existing job (%) 7 . 2 1 . 2 9 0.25
ourpow
Quits/retirements (%) 6 . 4 1.22 0.14
Direct fires (%) 2 . 3 0.74 0.16
Outflow from a destroyed job (%) 0 . 4 0.29 0.05
I n t e r n a l  m o b i l i t y
to a newly-created job (%) 0 0.02 0.00
to an existing job (by direct subordinate) (%) 0 . 6 0.40 0.01
to an existing job (from other team) (%) 1  .o 0.50 0 . 0 3
The internal mobility is clearly higher for large enterprises as they have more oppor-
tunities for job movers than small businesses have. This is due to the larger pool of
r
incumbent workers with sufficient qualifications. This result is in accordance with the
findings of Hamermesh et al. (1996) and Hassink  (1996).
Table 4 Simulation results for a large enterprise
Type and direction of worker flows
Survival rate
Startup length (years)
Number of levels
Number of employees in the firm
Inflow
Hire to a newly created job (%)
Hire to an existing job (%)
outg7ow
Quits/retirements (%)
Direct tires (%)
Outflow from a destroyed job (%)
Internal mobilit:
to a newly created job (%)
to an existing job (by direct subordinate) (%)
to an existing job (from other team) (%)
Within-standard Between-standard
Average deviation deviation
99%
19
5
192 44.2 93.9
8.6 48.2 25.4
2.4 15.7 16.0
9.3 9.3 8.5
0.9 5.0 I .o
0.6 13.1 2.7
3.5 21.6 18.6
0 . 1 0.8 0.3
9.4 16.5 27.4
Figure 3 illustrates the variance in firm size for the large enterprise, both within indi-
vidual businesses over time (measured by the withinstandard deviation) and between
enterprises (measured by the between-standard deviation). It shows the development
of four different simulated firms: a firm with an average within-deviation, the firm
with the highest within-deviation, and the firms with - on average - the most and least
employees. It is clear from figure 3 that the number of employees often changes; this
is also reflected in table 4 by the fact that variation in inflow (and internal mobility)
far exceeds the variation in outflow rates.
Figure 3 Four different ‘large’ enterprises
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Allaart  et al. (2000) have calculated worker flows for different size classes. This en-
ables us to compare our simulation outcomes with some empirical information. Al-
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laart et al. (2000) find that in- and outflow of workers vary less with size class than
internal flows do. Particularly for enterprises with 20-49 employees they find that in-
flow equals 12.5% of the number of employees, outflow 10.5% and internal flow
2.3%. For enterprises with more than 500 employees, these volumes are 12.6%,
11 .l% and 6.9%,  respectively. These results are comparable with Hassink  (1996),
who finds internal labour  flows of 2.4% for businesses with less than 100 employees,
and 4.9% for enterprises with more than 100 employees. Our model reproduces the
(small) difference in outflow between small and large enterprises rather well, but it
underestimates internal mobility for small businesses, and overestimates internal mo-
bility for large enterprises.
Sensitivity analysis
By way of sensitivity analysis, our final set of simulation experiments illustrates the
influence of parameter changes on size distribution of firms and on labour  flows.
These parameter changes represent various options for changing the performance of
the business. They may be associated with the various theoretical approaches to ex-
plain heterogeneity amongst enterprises, which are combined in the model. The aim of
these simulations is to give some indication, both in the case of a small business and
of a large enterprise, of the relative impact (on firm size) of various ways in which
enterprises may adapt their production process, internal organization and personnel
management. Simulations are conducted with the following parameter changes:
(9 Wage cost: these cost are defined by two parameters, viz. wage,  representing
the wage at the highest hierarchical level and wagl,  representing wage differ-
ences between the hierarchical levels. It should be noted that a change in
wage,  given wagl,  implies a change of all wages in the business. Also, since
product price is fixed and the model assumes completely elastic product de-
mand, a change of wage costs of the enterprise should be interpreted as a tirm-
specific change and may not be considered the consequence of a general wage
restraint or wage push.
(ii) Specialization: costs and benefits of specialization are represented by two dif-
ferent parameters.
(iii) Vertical transaction costs: here, the model includes 3 parameters which repre-
sent various types of vertical transaction costs, viz. the loss-of-control pa-
rameter, indicating how much supervision is needed per subordinate, and two
parameters which determine foregone production due to supervision cfgpc,
representing the costs at the highest hierarchical level, and fgpl,  representing
cost differences between the hierarchical levels).
(iv) Search cost: external and internal search costs have been altered proportion-
ally, as both costs have the same influence on the working of the model.
69 Search requirements: here, changes in three parameters are considered, viz. in
the ‘baseline’ minimum requirements reqc (the minimum requirements at the.
highest hierarchical level), the differences in requirements between hierarchi-
cal levels reql,  and the additional minimum requirement for an internal appli-
cant, rqie.  Given the average human capital of external applicants, lowering
the requirements enhances the probability of finding a suitable applicant, but
lowers the average quality of employees. Increasing additional minimum re-
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quirements for internal applicants enhances the average quality of those who
are promoted but decreases internal mobility.
(vi) Quit rate: the probability that employees decide to leave the enterprise, for
other reasons than retirement.
(vii) Average human capital: here, changes may occur due to a change in the aver-
age quality of external applicants @XL!!)  or a change in the effects of learning
by doing and training (grwe).
Tables 5 and 7 show the effect on the characteristics of the size distribution of the
firms and on labour  flows’s, when the parameter changes represent an increase in the
performance of the business: Tables 6 and 8 show the effect of opposite changes in
these model parameters.
As the response of our model to various shocks and parameter changes is highly non-
linear, mainly as a consequence of ratchet effects (change of number of levels), it ap-
pears that in some cases, small businesses react less strongly to changes than large
enterprises do. Therefore, we have conducted our simulation experiments with larger
parameter changes for the small business (tables 5 and 6) than for the large enter-
prise’s (tables 7 and 8).
Table 5 Changing parameter values to stimulate performance of small businesses
Survival
Size (nr. empl)
Within st.dev.
Between st.dev.
Inflow
Internal mobility
Survival
Size (nr. empl)
Within st.dev.
Between st.dev
Inflow
Internal mobilitv
.
bench
mark
99%
24.5
0.7
0.2
9.0%
1.6%
99%
24.5
0 . 7
0 . 2
9.0%
1.6%
wage
-5%
Wages Specialization
wag1 benefits costs
-2.5% +2.5% -5%
Vertical transaction costs
loss of @PC w
control
-1% -10% -2.5%
100%
24.5
0.7
0.1
9.0%
1.5%
Search
costs
-10%
99%
1 2 2 . 9
1.8
0.4
9.8%
2.4%
reqc
-35%
100% 99%
1 2 3 . 8 1 5 1 . 0
2 . 3 4.8
0 . 7 6.1
9.7% 9.5%
2.5% 4.5%
Search requirements
reql rqie
-25% -50%
100%
122.7
1.7
0 . 3
9.8%
2.3%
Quit
rate
-2%Dt
100% 100%
122.9 1 2 2 . 8
1 . 5 1.5
0 . 3 0 . 3
9.8% 9.9%
2.0% 2.0%
Human capital
pdfu grwe
+30% +75%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
122.1 24.5 24.4 24.5 24.6 24.5 24.6
1.7 0 . 7 0.7 0 . 7 0.6 0 . 7 0 . 7
0 . 3 0 . 2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 . 2 0.1
9.7% 7.1% 6.8% 9.2% 5.8% 7.7% 8.5%
2.6% 3.3% 3.7% 1.6% 1.6% 2.3% I .8%
15 Since our model represents firms in equilibrium, outflow and inflow rates are virtually identical. We therefore
only present the inflow rates in our tables.
16 For example: for large firms, the parameter on the effects of learning by doing and training (grwe) was changed
with +/- 10% (tables 7 and 8). For small firms, this change had no effect. Instead, tables 5 and 6 report the effects
of changes of +I- 75%.
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ITable 6 Changing parameter values to hamper performance of small businesses
Survival
Size (nr. empl)
Within st.dev.
Between st.dev.
lnflow
internal mobility
Survival
Size (nr. empl)
Within st.dev.
Between stdev.
Inflow
Internal mobility
bench
mark
99%
24.5
0 . 7
0 . 2
9.0%
1.6%
99%
24.5
0 . 7
0 . 2
9.0%
1.6%
wage
+5%
100%
4.8
0.4
0 . 1
9.5%
1 . 5 %
Search
costs
+lo%
100%
4.8
0.4
0.1
9.9%
1.5%
Wages
wag1
-+2.5%
100%
4.9
0.4
0.1
9.2%
1 . 5 %
reqc
+35%
6%
23.4
1.2
0.4
13.0%
I .6%
Specialization
benefits costs
-2.5% +5%
100% 100%
4.9 4.8
0.4 0.4
0 . 1 0.1
8.6% 9.8%
1.4% I .5%
Search requirements
reql rqie
+25% +50%
49% 69%
3 . 8 24.4
1 . 4 0.8
0 . 7 0.1
31.3% 9.3%
3.7% I .4%
Vertical transaction costs
loss of @PC ml
control
+I% +lo% +2.5%
100% 100% 99%
4.9 4.9 24.4
0.4 0.4 0.7
0.1 0.1 0 . 1
9.8% 9.1% 9.2%
1.4% 1.4% 1.7%
Quit Human capital
rate pdfu gnve
+3% pt -30% -75%
99% 68% 57%
24.0 23.6 24.2
1 . 0 1.1 0.9
0.2 0 . 3 0.2
18.3% 15.6% 12.4%
2.4% 2.1% 5.0%
Table 7 Changing parameter values to stimulate performance of large enterprises
Wages Specialization
bench wage wagl benefits costs
mark
-2.5% -2.5% +2.5% -2.5%
Size (nr. empl) 792 884.6 1 0 2 0 . 8 1 1 7 6 . 3 1171.6
Within st.dev. 44.2 44.7 47.3 30.9 29.1
Between st.dev. 93.9 1 1 2 . 5 1 1 5 . 3 1 . 9 40.5
Inflow 11.0% 10.7% 10.6% 10.6% 10.5%
lntemal mobility 13.0% 14.2% 12.0% 7.9% 7.6%
Search Search requirements
costs reqc reql rqie
-5% -10% -10% -10%
Size (nr. empl) 792 849.6 801.0 817.7 796.5
Within st.dev. 44.2 42.9 44.0 46.5 43.4
Between stdev. 93.9 1 0 7 . 0 97.7 1 0 8 . 6 8 6 . 2
Inflow 11.0% 10.8% 10.7% 10.0% 10.9%
Internal mobility 13.0% 15.7% 14.1% 14.6% 13.7%
Vertical transaction costs
loss of fw fd
control
-0.5% -5% -2.5%
849.7 837.9 848.6
44.9 44.5 40.8
59.9 99.1 97.2
10.9% 10.9% 10.8%
14.7% 14.3% 14.5%
Quit Human capital
rate pdfu gnve
-2% pt +lo% + I 0%
910.8 809 845
43.0 44.5 47.0
3 4 . 3 72.0 42.1
4.2% 10.6% I I .O%
12.2% 14.4% 17.5%
.
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Table 8: Changing parameter values to hamper performance of large enterprises
Size (tn. empl) 792
Within st.dev. 44.2
Between st.dev. 93.9
Inflow 11 .O%
Internal mobility 13.0%
Size (nr. empl)
Within st.dev.
Between st.dev.
Inflow
Internal mobility
bench
mark
792
44.2
93.9
11.0%
13.0%
wage
+2.5%
709.8
34.3
95.7
10.8%
10.3%
Search
costs
+5%
123.8
2.1
0.5
9.8%
2.4%
Wages
wag1
+2.5%
122.7
1.6
0.3
9.9%
2.3%
reqc
+lo%
800.3
38.8
82.4
11.1%
13.7%
Specialization
benefits costs
-2.5% +2.5%
122.2 609.8
1.6 4.2
0.4 0.7
9.8% 10.5%
2.5% 3.9%
Search requirements
reql rqie
+lo% +10%
736.4 806.5
3 2 43.6
1 0 0 79.8
13.2% 10.8%
9.4% 13.8%
Vertical transaction costs
loss of @PC fml
control
+0.5% +5% +2.5%
123.6 779.5 123.3
2.2 43.1 2.1
0.5 88.7 0.6
9.9% 10.9% 9.8%
2.5% 13.6% 2.7%
Quit Human capital
rate pdfu gnve
+3% pt -10% -10%
622.7 758.9 666.1
15 37.9 26.6
19.1 101.9 83.1
24.6% 11.2% 10.7%
7.3% 11.7% 6.3%
These simulation exercises lead to the following conclusions with respect to differ-
ences between small and large enterprises:
l Small businesses react less strongly to changes in their (internal and external) en-
vironment than large enterprises do.
l Large enterprises always survive the 50-year period of our simulations (therefore,
the survival rate has not been reported in tables 7 and 8). For small businesses, this
is not the case.
l Variation in firm size is always due to variation in team size (at all levels), never
in number of levels. The number of hierarchical levels is determined by model pa-
rameters representing the production and management of the business, and not by
the stochastics  of the internal and external labour  markets.
l As long as enterprises have no more than four levels, firm size shows very little
variation over the simulations (4.9, 24.5 and 123 employees for 2, 3 and 4 levels,
respectively). In contrast, there is much more variation in businesses with five lev-
els (610 to 1,176 employees). This variation is ultimately caused by the variation
in human capital of individual employees. Apparently, the factors that cause en-
terprises to become so large that their organization consists of five hierarchical
levels, also enhance the relation between optimal firm size and human capital of
their (incumbent) employees. This suggests that with large (5leveled)  firms, per-
sonnel management (hiring and selection of new employees and internal mobility
of incumbent employees) and organizational changes may influence firm size.
With respect to the technicalities of the production process (wage costs, costs and
benefits of specialization), the following conclusions emerge from the simulation ex-
periments:
l Changes in the respective parameter values have a clear effect on the number of
employees. For small businesses, the number of employees changes because a hi-
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erarchical level is added or removed. For large enterprises, levels may be re-
moved, but a sixth level is never added to the firm.
l The benchmark model of the large enterprise shows a substantial variation of av-
erage size between firms, which is caused by the heterogeneity of the labour  force.
Changes in the benefits and costs of specialization may, however, make the het-
erogeneity of employees become irrelevant again (as is the case for the small busi-
nesses). Enhancing the benefits of horizontal coordination by 2.5% results in a
48% increase of average firm size, while the between-firm standard deviation re-
duces almost  to nil (table 7). A 2.5% increase of the costs of horizontal co-
ordination lead to a 23% decrease of average size (without removing a hierarchical
level), and again the between-firm standard deviation becomes very small (table
8).
With respect to the features of equilibrium search theory (search cost, requirements
for candidates, quits) that are incorporated in the model, the simulation experiments of
this sensitivity analysis give rise to the following conclusions:
l Search/adjustment cost have a substantial influence on the equilibrium size of the
firm: increasing costs have a negative effect on the number of employees, both for
small and for large enterprises.
l Factors that determine the quality requirements for internal and external candi-
dates have a different effect on small and large enterprises: for small businesses,
they influence the survival rate (and the size of the inflow), and for large enter-
prises, they influence the number of employees.
l The observed variation in firm size for the large enterprises depends strongly on
the quit rate: if employees do not leave the company (except when retiring), the
between-firm standard deviation is reduced from 93.9 to 19.1.
l An increase in the quit rate leads to a rise in direct dismissals. The underlying
mechanism is that an increase in quit rate results in a rise of external recruitments.
With a constant fraction of new employees being dismissed after a year (because
their qualities turned out to be insufficient), an increase in external recruitments
leads to a rise in outflow by direct fires.
Finally, with respect to human capital of individual employees (variation in qualities
of external candidates, effects of learning by doing and company-provided training),
the following conclusions are in order.
l Decreasing the available quality and/or lowering the effects of learning by doing
and the returns to training has a negative effect on the survival rates of small busi-
nesses and on the average size of large enterprises.
l For small businesses, the characteristics of individual employees are negatively
related with inflow (and outflow): if the average quality is higher and/or training
becomes more effective, then in- and outflow rates decline. For large enterprises,
the characteristics of individual employees have no effect on inflow rates.
; The relations with internal mobility are less clear for small businesses than for
large enterprises. For large enterprises, there is a positive relation with internal
mobility. With small businesses, both increases and decreases in the relevant
model parameters seem to have a positive effect on internal mobility rates.
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7. Conclusions
By using a calibrated simulation model, this paper provides a quantitative view on the
importance of various determinants of the size distribution of firms. Although the
model has a neo-classical background in the sense that optimal firm size is determined
by profit maximizing, it combines a number of other approaches fi-om  economic lit-
erature which aim at explaining firm heterogeneity and variations in firm size. In this
respect, our model pays ample attention to the various forms of transaction costs.
Moreover, the model delineates external and internal labour  flows; and in doing so, it
shows how the performance of the firm and, therefore, its size is influenced by aspects
of human capital and personnel management, such as hiring costs, firing costs, search
costs, wage policy, training, job matching and setting requirements for worker qualifi-
cation. In fact, our modelling exercise fully appreciates the observation by Conlisk
(1996) that ‘a central insight is that the existence, size, structure and workings of or-
ganizations are critically shaped by a need to economize on various transaction costs’.
Our model is capable of reproducing all these insights, and the experiments with the
model show the relative effectiveness of such economizing.
The sophistication of the model does not only enable us to explain size differences
between enterprises of different sectors (which had already been explained by micro-
economic theory) but, also, to explain why enterprises within the same sector may dif-
fer in size. The model shows that there are two sources for such size differences of
firms within the same sector. The first source is differences in transaction costs that
may lead, as theory predicts, to size differences between firms that operate otherwise
in the same circumstances. Our simulation experiments also show that the elasticity of
transaction costs - i.e. the difference in firm size evoked by a 1% difference in trans-
action costs - depends on firm size itself.
The second source of size differences between firms of the same sector is heterogene-
ity of labour  supply and the reaction of personnel management on such heterogeneity.
Even when transaction costs are the same for similar firms, their sizes may differ due
to the qualities and qualifications of incumbent workers. The magnitude of this effect
appears again to be different in small businesses and large enterprises. The relative
influence that labour  heterogeneity has on firm size depends crucially on the ratio
between transaction costs and wage costs. In our calibrated model, small businesses
with a relatively flat organization and few hierarchical levels face relatively few trans-
action costs, but transaction costs gain importance when the number of hierarchical
levels rises and intra-firm bureaucracy increases. Therefore, the impact of labour  het-
erogeneity (and the scope for HRM) on business performance and firm size is more
severe in large enterprises than in small businesses. This conclusion is in line with
Boone and van Witteloostuijn (1996),  who find that the impact of human capital is
more pronounced in large than in small businesses. Moreover, it is not so much the
quantity of (internal) labour  flows but more so the quality of these flows that matters
for business performance..
Transaction cost may be categorized into coordination costs and costs of motivation.
Coordination costs are indicators for the quality of management and for how well
structured the organization of the enterprise is. In smaller businesses, where the owner
is both entrepreneur and manager, coordination costs also relate to entrepreneurial
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qualities. The model simulations show that the success and survival probabilities of
new businesses depend heavily on these entrepreneurial qualities.
The specification and calibration of our model needed a number of assumptions on
both the shape and parameter values of the production process and the transaction
costs associated with company management. Although we have exploited as much as
possible existing empirical evidence for specifying and calibrating the model, it is ob-
vious that considerable part of the information that is crucial for the working of the
model, is still lacking. E.g. much more empirical data are needed in order to come to a
more robust specification of the relationship between the span of control, vertical and
horizontal transaction costs and optimal team size. The sensitivity analysis of the pre-
vious section indicates that these data, and data on human capital and costs associated
with hiring, firing, quitting and training, are essential for a better understanding of the
reasons why profit-maximizing businesses differ in size. Collecting these data in indi-
vidual case studies of enterprises seems an important scope for future research. Our
modelling exercise provides a framework for the collection of these data.
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Appendix: The calibrated simulation model
In this appendix, the simulation model is described. First, the specification of the
simulation model is provided, including the calibrated model parameters of the base-
line simulation. Next, the marginal costs and benefits of hiring additional subordinates
are derived. For the special case where all employees have the same average quality,
we examine under which conditions a positive and finite team size (the profit-
maximizing number of subordinates) is guaranteed.
Specljkation
The profit function in period t of each supervisor (occupied at hierarchical level i) is
specified as:
P?&  Cnt  ) =  2 (PtaCnt  kj,i+l,r  - Wj,i+l,r  - fPj,i+l,,  >  - AC(n,  3 n:-*  >  3
j=O
and is maximized with respect to the number of subordinates nt (withj=O to nt an in-
dex of the subordinates). Here, n:-,  is the currently available number of subordinates.
The constituent parts are the following functions:
Production: qj,i,t  = Yq,l (Yq,Ji cj,i,t,
with yq,l  = 150 and yq,2  = 0.85
(loss-of-control parameter).
Small and large benchmark firms are simulated by assuming an average production of
141 and 154, respectively.
Supervision costs: fij,i,t  = Yfi.1  (yfp.Ji (llcj,i,t)T
with yfp,,  = 37.5 and yfp,2  = 1.
Cooperation: a(n) = - an*+Pn  + 1,
costs: a = 0.05625,
Benefits: p=  0.45.
Wage wj,i,  t = Yw.1  (Ih.l.*Y  cj,  i,tp
with yw,,  = 175 and yw,*  = 0.75.
In this specification, the loss of control (vertical transaction costs) is incorporated in
the production function. The costs of cooperation (horizontal transaction costs) and
benefits of cooperation are combined into a parabolic function.
The functionpt defines the price of the output as it will be received by the firm. In our
simulations, we assume a constant price: pt = 1.
The relative quality measure qit is defined as:
qit = qua$t / E(qAit) if the job is occupied by subordinate j, and
= 1 if the job is vacant,
where qua$t is the actual quality of subordinate j, and E(qAit) the expected quality of
an external applicant.
24
Dynamics are incorporated in the model through the adjustment costs,
AC(q,  n,*-,  ) = --fYit  (nt n:-,  ) I(ntn:-, CO)  + Siit min(nt n:-,  , ninq +
+ Sf?it max(ntn:-, -rzint, 0) I(ntn:-, >O),
with nint the number of potential internal candidates for the job (defined as the num-
ber of employees at the next lower level), and I(.) the indicator function. The three
different search costs are:
External search costs Sit = 50.
Firing costs fYit= 0.5 Seit .
Internal search costs Siit =  0.66 Seit .
Both quality and age of external candidates are drawn from a uniform probability den-
sity function with upper and lower bounds that vary per level:
Quality of applicant @it - UIWqbt,  P4t)9
q&t  = Yqlb.1 (Yqprob,#,
Bit = Yqub,l (Yqprobdiy
with yqlb,,  = 3, Yqub,l  = 11.6 and yqprob,2  = 0.87.
Hence, expected quality  is equal to E(qAit) = ypd,,  (yprob,2)i,  with  yprob,,  = (%&  +
Yqub,,@ = ‘7.3.
Age of applicant Agvt - UNIF(albit,  aubit),
albit  = Yalb.1 (Yaprob,  $3
aubit  = Yaub.1  (Yaprob,#,
with YaZb.1  = 4% Yaub.1  = 80 and Yaprob, = 0.80.
The ‘baseline’ minimum requirements are given by:
Vit  = Ymq.1 (YmqJi9
with ymq,l  = 10 and ymq,2 = 0.75.
For an internal applicant, the minimum requirements are:
V i  tint  = U+K?@.)  Ti,  tj
with ~QIE  = 0.10,
while for an external applicant, the minimum requirements equal:
Wi  text  = (I-~QTR) mqi, t,
Wit;  mQTR  ,=  0.20.
Furthermore, we have a number of functions that specify the relations between suc-
‘cessive  periods. We have a random quit probability, which is actually defined as the
probability that an employee remains in the firm, (~-YQuIT)~,  with YQU~T  = 0.02.
There is a retirement age: an employee who reaches the age of Y~TR  = 60 is retired.
For each worker who does not quit, we introduce an accumulation of quality, quaQ,t+,
= qua$t  (1+2( %)te@U), where U is the random factor drawn from a uniform distri-
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bution  U - UNIF(0, YGRWE)  with YGRWE  = 0.20, and tenJj,  is the tenure in the cur-
rent job.
Marginal costs and benefits
The optimal number of subordinates may be determined by comparing the marginal
costs (mc) and benefits (mb) of hiring an additional subordinate. The marginal costs
for a (potential) supervisor of.hiring an (additional) subordinate are the sum of addi-
tional coordination costs, supervision costs, wage costs and adjustment costs. For a
supervisor at hierarchical level (i-l) who currently employs N subordinates (NkO),  the
marginal costs mci-I,N+I  of hiring an additional subordinate are17:
N+l
mCi-I,N+I  = a(N  + 1)’  C  qj,i  -d2  g  qj,i  + fiN+l,i  + wN+l,i  + A’
j=O j=O
=cm2  +2crN+a)y,,,(y,,2)icN+,,i  ‘(2N’l)ay,,,(Y~,,)i(~c,,i)
j=O
The marginal benefits of hiring an additional subordinate are the sum of the benefits
from the additional employee, and the changes in the benefits of the incumbent N em-
ployees. These changes are caused by changes in the benefits of cooperation if an ad-
ditional employee would be hired:
mbi-l,N+l = (P(N  + 1)  + ‘)qN+l,i +(P(N+l)-PN)iqj,i
j=O
= (PN  + P  + ‘jYq.1  (Yg,2  ji  cN+l,i  + PYq.1  (Yq,2  ji  i  ‘j,i
j&J
If an employee decides to become (or stay) a supervisor, then the profit-maximizing
number of subordinates P is given by the conditions ??ZCi-l,N*  < mb i-I,N* and mci-
1 N*+l > mb i-1  N*+l.  The unique solution P may be found by finding the solution
to T?ZCi-l,N+l  = hb i-I,N+]  (and rounding off the solution)‘?
mCi-I,N+I  = mbi-l,N+l
e tBalv2 -(2a-P)N-a’p’l)Y,,,(y,,2)icN+,,i +(-2aN-a+a)y,,,(y~,,)‘~cj,;
j=O
.
1 7 The time index t is removed from all equations, since it has no relevance for the calculations presented here.
18 In addition, the first derivative of the marginal costs with respect to the number of subordinates must exceed the
first derivative of the marginal benefits.
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Team size in firms with homogeneous employees
In the special case where all employees have the same, average quality (c~,~  = 1 V j,i),
the equations for marginal costs and benefits become less complicated. The marginal
costs equation may be simplified to:
mCi-l,N+I = (&* + 2fl+  a)Y,,,  kg,2  Y + (2N + l)dTq,~  (1/,,2  ji + Yf,,l  (Tfi,*Y  + Yw,l  (Yw,2  Ii + AC
=3~~~.,(y,,)‘~2+3a;v,,,(Y4,2)i~+CTYQ,,(Yg,2)i+Yfp,l(Yfp,2)i+Yw,*(Yw,*)i+~C
=w*  +q,N+q*
with cpk>O  for k=1,2.
The values of these parameters depend on the hierarchical level i (for notational con-
venience, the hierarchical level index i has been left out). Both the first-order and sec-
ond-order derivative with respect to N are positive, so the marginal costs are a strict
convex function of the number of incumbent subordinates.
The marginal benefits may be rewritten as:
m&N+1  = W + P + lkq,,  (yq,2  ji + NY,,,  kq,2  Y
=2By,,,(~,,,)‘N+(2P+l)~,,,(~,,*)’
=e,N+e,
with 8,>0 for k=1,2.
The marginal benefits are now increasing linearly with the number of incumbent sub-
ordinates (again, the hierarchical level index i has been left out).
A necessary condition for a finite team size is that hCi-l,N  / mb i-I,N>l  for N + 00.
This condition is always met (given that all model parameters are strictly positive):
=,,;N+~>l
1 1
Whether or not an employee becomes a supervisor, depends on other criteria. A sufli-
cient  condition is that mci-l,I / mb i-l,l<l: the benefits of hiring the first subordinate
exceed the costs. For the calibrated model, this condition is met for the first three lev-
els of the firm. This implicates that the baseline firm should consist of at least four
levels. As discussed in the main text, this is the actual number of levels for the base-
line simulation. For the small business, this condition is met for the first level only,
and for the large enterprise for the first three levels.
Both the small and the large enterprise have one level more than the minimum im-
plied by the condition mci-l,l / mb i-l,l<l. Apparently, even if this condition doesn’t
hold, it may still be profitable to hire several employees. This is because marginal
costs are a convex function of N, and marginal benefits a linear function (see figure 4
for an example). Necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for this solution are that
*mci-l,l  I mb i-l,l>l and {a WlCi-l,N/dN)/  {a mb i-l,N/aw<  1 for N=O.  This second
inequality is equivalent with cp,  / 8, < le alp < 2/3.  This second condition is met in
our calibrated model.
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Figure 4 Marginal costs and marginal benefits
Number of subordinates (A’)
If the conditions that guarantee a finite number of subordinates are met, then team size
is implicitly defined by the following equation:
*  mci-I,N+I  ‘4j.i  = mbi-l,N+l  ‘4j.i
Marginal benefits per unit of production only depend on the benefits of cooperation
and the number of incumbent workers, and are independent of the hierarchical level i.
In contrast, marginal costs per unit of production differ between hierarchical levels. In
our calibrated version of the model, the relative share of the supervision costs in-
creases with the level, while the relative weight of the adjustment and wage costs de-
creases .
.
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